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Abstract
Background: Performance-Based Financing (PBF), an innovative health financing initiative, was recently
implemented in Mali. PBF aims to improve quality of care by motivating health workers. The purpose of this
research was to identify and understand how health workers’ expectations related to their experiences of the first
cycle of payment of PBF subsidies, and how this experience affected their motivation and sentiments towards the
intervention. We pose the research question, “how does the process of PBF subsidies impact the motivation of
health workers in Mali?”
Methods: We adopted a qualitative approach using multiple case studies. We chose three district hospitals (DH 1, 2
and 3) in three health districts (district 1, 2 and 3) among the ten in the Koulikoro region. Our cases correspond to
the three DHs. We followed the principle of data source triangulation; we used 53 semi-directive interviews
conducted with health workers (to follow the principle of saturuation), field notes, and documents relating to the
distribution grids of subsidies for each DH. We analyzed data in a mixed deductive and inductive manner.
Results: The results show that the PBF subsidies led to health workers feeling more motivated to perform their
tasks overall. Beyond financial motivation, this was primarily due to PBF allowing them to work more efficiently.
However, respondents perceived a discrepancy between the efforts made and the subsidies received. The fact that
their expectations were not met led to a sense of frustration and disappointment. Similarly, the way in which the
subsidies were distributed and the lack of transparency in the distribution process led to feelings of unfairness
among the vast majority of respondents. The results show that frustrations can build up in the early days of the
intervention.
Conclusion: The PBF implementation in Mali left health workers frustrated. The short overall implementation period
did not allow actors to adjust their initial expectations and motivational responses, neither positive nor negative.
This underlines how short-term interventions might not just lack impact, but instil negative sentiments likely to
carry on into the future.
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Background
The performance of health workers is a determining fac-
tor in the provision of health care. It influences the qual-
ity of the health services offered and the level of health
of the population [1, 2]. Several factors influence the
performance of health workers in low- and middle-
income countries (LMICs): financial and non-financial
incentives, career development, continuing education,
the state of infrastructure, the availability of human and
material resources, the management and leadership skills
of managers, and job satisfaction [3].
Despite the fact that motivation is one of the key fac-
tors in job performance, it remains a challenge in
LMICs. There are several theories about motivation at
work [4, 5]. Ryan and Deci define motivation as the drive
or energy to act towards an objective [6]. In Mali, the
Ministry of Health postulates that health workers work-
ing in the public system are very poorly motivated, re-
gardless of whether they work in rural or urban areas
[7]. Reasons for their lack of motivation are diverse: in-
sufficient remuneration, poor physical working condi-
tions, lack of professional training, lack of consideration,
and poor organization and distribution of work [7, 8].
In LMICs, several pilot projects of performance-based
financing (PBF) have been implemented with the aim of
improving health service provision. One assumed result
is that by linking financial rewards to predefined per-
formance objectives, health workers will be more moti-
vated to perform well [9]. Over the past several years,
the architecture of health financing in LMICs has
evolved significantly in Africa [10, 11], with PBF being
one of the most important, but not the only new intro-
duction to the health financing landscape. While PBF
aims to strengthen the capacity of health systems in a
sustainable manner, this is not always the case [12, 13].
Many initiatives financed by international donors are
short-term interventions with the desire to have a rapid
impact to the detriment of medium- and long-term
interventions [10, 14, 15].
A number of studies have looked into the effects of
PBF on health worker motivation in Africa [12, 16–20].
However, there is not yet scientific consensus on these
effects, their direction and strength, their exact mecha-
nisms, nor on developments over time [20–25]. In
regards to the latter, the majority of existing studies
were carried out fairly long after the start of implemen-
tation (12 months in Burkina Faso, [17], 18 months in
Nigeria [26], 24months in Malawi [20]). Studies suggest
that the initial months of implementation were particularly
crucial in shaping expectations and sentiments towards
PBF that would carry through the entire implementation
period. The long recall periods over an extensive imple-
mentation period likely distorted memories particularly in
relation to the early implementation days.
To our knowledge, in Africa, the gap between what
health workers expect from the PBF and the reality is
very little studied, especially in relation to the early days
of implementation. In Mali, PBF was only implemented
for 8 months in total. The purpose of this research was
to identify and understand how health workers’ expecta-
tions related to their experiences of the first cycle of pay-
ment of PBF subsidies, and how this experience affected
their motivation and sentiments towards the interven-
tion. We pose the research question, “how does the




Mali is a country in West Africa with an estimated
population of 19,658,031 inhabitants as of 2019 [27]. It
is subdivided into eight regions and the district of
Bamako. In 2012, the country experienced a political, se-
curity, and institutional crisis following the occupation
of the northern regions by armed groups, and the coup
d’état of March 22 [28].
Between June 2016 and February 2017, a PBF pilot pro-
ject took place in ten health districts in Mali’s Koulikoro
region, as one of the sub-components of the Ministry of
Health’s Strengthening Reproductive Health Project,
funded by the World Bank. This project supports the
strengthening of the health system through three compo-
nents: (i) strengthening the supply and quality of repro-
ductive health services; (ii) increasing the demand for
reproductive health services; and (iii) strengthening social
responsibility, project management, and monitoring-
evaluation.
The objective of the pilot PBF project nested within this
overall project was to increase the use of quality repro-
ductive health services by increasing the motivation, re-
sponsibility, and accountability of service providers to
achieve results [29]. For the implementation of the project,
the Ministry of Health entered into a service contract with
a specialized PBF agency, referred to as the Consortium
(Royal Tropical Institute, Clinique de Gestion et d’Innova-
tion des Connaissances, and Cordaid). Initially, the project
was planned for 2 years [30]. For politico-administrative
reasons, however, it ultimately only ran for 8 months. Sev-
eral activities were carried out during its short implemen-
tation: training of actors, development of results plans,
signing of contracts, production of results by health cen-
ters, reporting and verification of results in terms of
quantity and quality of care, community verification,
measurement of user satisfaction, and payment for results
of one three-month cycle [31].
Mali’s health system is pyramidal at three levels (per-
ipheral, intermediate, and central). At the central level,
there are national hospitals and university hospitals. At
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the intermediate level are reference health centers
(Centre de santé de reference [CSRéf]) or district hospi-
tals (DH). At peripheral level, community health centres
(Centres de santé communautaires [CSCom]) provide
primary-level care. This PBF pilot project concerned
only DHs and community health centres in the Kouli-
koro region. The DHs and community health centres
were to be paid on the basis of results concerning repro-
ductive health indicators (family planning, delivery by
qualified personnel, pre- and post-natal care) [29]. Veri-
fication of results in terms of quantity and quality to
authorize the payment of subsidies (which is the term
locally used for the PBF payment, synonymous with in-
centives or bonuses) were supposed to be carried out on
a monthly basis. However, this schedule was not adhered
to in practice, with verification activities delayed by 7 to
6 months depending on the hospital. Local NGOs car-
ried out community verification (CV) in the last month
of implementation (February 2017), and factored it into
the one payment made into the facilities’ bank accounts
in February 2017.
In the DHs, at least 40% of the total amount of subsid-
ies was reserved for investments and purchase of equip-
ment, and a maximum of 60% could be used as
individual subsidies for health workers. In community
health centres, at least 60% of the total subsidies had to
be invested or used for purchasing equipment, and 40%
could be used as individual subsidies for health workers.
In regard to the individual subsidies, a fixed portion of
28% was to be distributed according to the socio-
professional category of the health workers, and a vari-
able portion of 72% according to individual performance
over a three-month period [32]. The calculation of the
performance percentage was made on the basis of the
tasks recorded in each individual’s engagement form
[32]. The fixed portion was calculated on the basis of
each health workers’ salary category. For health workers
whose wages were lower than the guaranteed minimum
interprofessional wage, the amount was calculated by
dividing the net monthly wage by an index value of 335
CFA francs (US $0.56) [32]. PBF provided an excel
spreadsheet to facilitate the calculation of the total
amounts to be received by each facility staff.
Important discrepancies existed between what was
foreseen at the outset of implementation and stipulated
in the procedures manual, and what was actually imple-
mented. Most importantly, while two cycles of service
purchasing (including verification and payment) were
planned, only one cycle (3 months) was completed dur-
ing the 8 months of implementation.
Study design
We adopted a qualitative approach, based on an estimate
of multiple case studies [33]. Our study is part of a larger
research program in the context of which the cases were
selected. For our study, we chose three DHs (DH 1, 2
and 3) in three health districts (district 1, 2 and 3)
among the ten in the Koulikoro region. Our cases cor-
respond to the three DHs. District 1 was more of a rural
region, and had participated in the PBF pre-pilot project
from February 2012 to December 2013, unlike Districts
2 and 3. District 2 was chosen because it was more
urban than the other two districts. District 3 was se-
lected because it was intended to link PBF with the
community-based health insurance already existing
there. These numbers of cases take into account our re-
source constraints, but provide sufficient representation
of the diversity of contextual situations conducive to the
analytical generalization specific to the case studies [34].
Sampling of participants
Participants were purposively selected to reflect all
socio-professional categories and sub-profiles working at
the DH, and thereby achieve maximum variation in
opinions and experiences of PBF. Once in the field, TZ
selected the respondents in a purposive manner to rep-
resent all stakeholder groups (Table 1) and in consider-
ation of their availability at the time of the survey. Once
he had reached saturation at a study site, TZ proceeded
with data collection at the next district hospital. Of the
resulting sample of 53 respondents, 34 were male and 19
were female.
Analysis framework and data collection
We used Paul and Robinson’s classification of motiv-
ation types [35]. According to this classification, health
worker motivation can be broadly categorized into three
types: financial, social, and internal (Table 2).
The PBF pilot project ended in February 2017. Ac-
cording to DHs, the payment of the first and only
round of PBF subsidies was made approximately 5 to
6 months (July to August 2017) after the end of the
project. From October 2, 2017 to November 20, 2017,
TZ conducted 53 semi-structured interviews with
health workers in three DHs in the Koulikoro re-
gion—about 2 months after the payment of subsidies.
TZ, AC, AF, JL, and VR developed the data collection
tools. We used two semi-structured interviews guides:
one for the District Health Manager, and another for
the rest of the staff. We followed the principle of tri-
angulation advocated in the case studies by using
multiple lines of evidence [33]. The different data
sources used were: the 53 semi-directive interviews
conducted with the different groups of actors, the TZ
field notes, and documents relating to the distribution
grids of subsidies for each DH. We used subsidy dis-
tribution grids to triangulate respondents’ information
on the amount of subsidies obtained and the criteria
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taken into account when calculating subsidies in each
DHs.
Data processing and analysis
Research assistants transcribed the data verbatim, with
quality monitored by the research team. TZ performed
data coding using a code tree constructed by TZ, AC,
AF, JL, and VR along Paul and Robinson’s classification
of motivation types [35]. We followed a mixed
deductive-inductive approach to content analysis based
primarily on the predefined code tree, but allowed a few
additional codes to emerge from the data as we went
through the material. We used QDA Miner Lite for data
coding. All authors discussed the resulting coding, and
agreed on the emerging interpretation.
Results
This section presents the main findings on the modal-
ities and process of distribution of the first round of PBF
subsidy payments, and its effects on the motivation of
health workers.
Motivation of health workers before the arrival of the PBF
The vast majority of respondents said they chose their
profession out of vocation or love for their job, and that
they loved working in their job before the arrival of PBF.
In their opinion, being a health care worker is a noble
profession in society. For health workers, contact with
patients on a daily basis and the care they provide is a
great source of inner satisfaction (internal motivation).
However, many respondents cited difficulties in their
working conditions (low salary, lack of equipment,
retraining, and human resources) as hindering their abil-
ity to provide quality care to the population. At times,
these difficulties negatively affected their motivation.
Positive PBF effects on health worker motivation
Prior to the implementation of the PBF, the vast major-
ity of health workers did not receive individual subsidies
or other bonus payments. Respondents recognized that
there was a change in their attitudes when their work
started being valued by a financial subsidy (financial mo-
tivation). The majority of respondents equated receiving
subsidies with both encouragement and incentive to do
Table 1 Respondents in the study
Respondents DH1 DH2 DH3 Total
Socio-professional category Profiles
A Specialist doctor 1 1 0 2
General physician 0 2 2 4
Pharmacist 1 0 0 1
Medical Assistant 3 1 1 5
B Senior Health Technician 5 1 4 10
Health technician 4 3 0 7
State nurse 2 1 3 6
Midwife 2 1 2 5
Financial Controller 0 1 1 2
C Obstetrician Nurse 2 1 0 3
Executive Secretary 0 1 0 1
D Ambulance driver 0 2 2 4
E Hygienist 0 1 0 1
Security guard 0 0 2 2
Total 20 16 17 53
Table 2 Paul and Robinson’s classification of health worker motivation types
Types of Motivations Description
Financial motivation Performance driven by desire to obtain subsidies/bonuses, salary, or other financial benefits.
Social motivation Performance driven by social relationships in the workplace that promote feeling of approval and/or
acceptance of others, which are related to the need to identify with a group, to adhere to standards.
The concept of a sense of justice in the sense of fair treatment is central.
Internal motivation Performance is driven by desire to act in accordance with one’s values and beliefs, independently of
personal benefits, in order to feel that one’s behaviour has meaning and/or to enjoy doing one’s job
on a daily basis, the various tasks related to that job, having an interest in those tasks in itself.
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their job better. In addition, they perceived individual
and hospital subsidies as a means to improving their dif-
ficult working conditions:
“When there are (individual) subsidies, it changes
people’s behaviour. In spite of the willingness, i.e. the
willingness to work well, when there is money it al-
ways supports that. No matter what people say,
money is a source of motivation. Today in a struc-
ture like the district hospital, it is the subsidies that
can motivate the staff to do well. I don’t see anything
else” [Specialist doctor, HD 2]
It was not only the financial aspect of the PBF that af-
fected their motivation, but PBF also increased internal
motivation:
“When you do a good job, you feel in yourself that
you’ve done a good job, there’s satisfaction, that’s not
material, but it makes you feel comfortable inside”
[Senior Health Technician, HD1]
According to some respondents, improved recognition
of their work by their superiors was another factor con-
tributing to their job satisfaction (internal motivation).
Moreover, according to some respondents, PBF made it
possible to better describe and distribute work tasks be-
tween health workers, contributing to better planning
and organization of daily work.
Development process of health workers’ expectations
regarding subsidies
The vast majority of health workers were happy when
the subsidies were announced with the introduction of
PBF. However, after receiving their first PBF subsidies,
respondents felt disappointed because they perceived a
huge gap between the amounts hoped for and the
amounts received. Most respondents found the amount of
individual subsidy received was too low, and therefore not
motivating. In addition, they perceived a discrepancy be-
tween the efforts made and the amount obtained (financial
motivation). Disappointment with the subsidy amount
varied from one socio-professional category to another.
Specifically, disappointment was greater among health
workers in the lower-level categories C, D, and E (hygien-
ist, ambulance driver, security guard, etc.), because they
placed more hope in the amount of the subsidies than
those in higher-level categories A and B (doctors, pharma-
cists, and administrative staff). For example, in the three
HDs, health workers in socio-professional categories A
and B obtained between 20,000 CFA francs (US $32.99)
and 30,000 CFA francs (US $49.49) as an individual sub-
sidy for the one paid cycle, which corresponds to 3
months of the PBF. Those in categories C, D, and E had
individual subsidy ranging from 3500 CFA francs (US
$5.77) to 15,000 CFA francs (US $24.74):
“I know of [a] Hygienist who went into debt because
they said there’s PBF subsidies ... they got 3,500 CFA
francs (US $5.85) as a subsidies... (Laughing) they were
really discouraged.” [male ambulance driver, HD2]
“I felt a little discouraged about what I was given as
payment. I told myself that I actually worked for
three months and at the end of my effort I only re-
ceived 24,000 CFA francs (US $40.14). For this rea-
son, I planned to eventually do another activity, and
leave the PBF for the benefit of this activity. For ex-
ample, if I had a mission within the district, I will
forcibly leave the follow-up here, because I know that
in two or three days I will have 40,000 CFA francs
(US $66.90). Because everyone is chasing after profit.
Here I don’t think if someone has exceeded 30,000
CFA francs (US $50.17) or 40,000 CFA francs (US
$66.90)” [Senior Health Technician, HD1].
In addition, DH 1 health workers who had previously
participated in the PBF pre-pilot project were more dis-
appointed with the amount of individual subsidy re-
ceived compared to DH 2 and 3, as the majority of them
hoped for an amount on average equal to those they ob-
tained during the PBF pre-pilot project, where higher
subsidies had been paid.
Effects of PBF implementation difficulties on the
motivation of health workers
According to DHs, there was a 6 to 7 months delay in
the distribution of subsidies. There are two reasons for
this delay: administrative delays due to the complexity of
the PBF process, and errors in bank processing. Respon-
dents stated that they had not received any formal infor-
mation on the reasons for the delay. The lack of
transparency caused the circulation of rumors accusing
those responsible of having embezzled subsidies. Some
health workers felt that if subsidies are delayed, officials
need to communicate the reasons better. Health
workers’ suspicions of their managers reveal a lack of
confidence in the management of finances.
In addition to creating a lack of confidence in the PBF
mechanism among health workers, the delay in the dis-
bursement of subsidies and its distribution also led to a
lack of motivation among the workers. Health workers
were informed individually by the hospital accounting
department when the subsidies arrived. However, there
was no meeting to inform the health workers about the
overall amount of subsidies, individual subsidies, and
hospital investment subsidies. A significant number of
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respondents stated that the subsidy sharing process was
not transparent, which decreased motivation (social
motivation):
“When they call you just to give you a sum of money,
I can even say that the district hospital got billions
and they only gave me 20,000 CFA francs (US
$33.95) when that's not it, you have to be transparent
because that's the best way” [Medical Assistant,
HD1].
Prior to the start of the project, the PBF agency estab-
lished a key for the distribution of subsidies with several
criteria to be used for the calculation of subsidies. Apart
from the members of the district health management
team (district health manager, manager, and unit heads),
most health workers had only partial knowledge of these
criteria. Respondents stated that details of the distribu-
tion of subsidies were not discussed in depth during the
training sessions. The managers of DH 1 had a better
grasp of how subsidies were distributed compared to
those of DH 2 and 3 since they had already participated
in the PBF pre-pilot project. In two DHs (DH 2 and 3),
most of the distribution criteria were not applied when
the subsidies were distributed. For example, in DH 2,
some volunteer trainees and members of the manage-
ment committee received unforeseen subsidies. Simi-
larly, in DH 2 and 3, individual performance was not
evaluated. This omission was possibly because the evalu-
ation of individual performance had not been carried
out. According to some hospital officials, since the PBF
project had already ended, there was no longer a point
in evaluating the health workers, and doing so would
only create tensions within the teams. In contrast to this
judgement, DH 1 health workers, where individual per-
formance evaluation had taken place, stressed the im-
portance of knowing their individual performance rating
as an important element for morale:
“If I don't even know the grade I've got, I can really
get an idea that somewhere they've taken something
off, ... I can get fuzzy ideas.” [Senior Health Techni-
cian, DH 1]
As a result of the above issues, the vast majority of
health workers felt that the subsidies were not well allo-
cated (social motivation). In addition, they felt that the
criteria considered when calculating the subsidies did
not reflect everyone’s effort. In the absence of individual
performance evaluations in DHs 2 and 3, there was a
discrepancy in views among the different actors with
regard to the criteria that should have been considered
for the sharing of subsidies. Ideas varied in relation to
the socio-professional category of health workers. In
particular, for the majority of category C, D, and E
health workers, subsidies should have been shared
equally among all health workers without distinction of
socio-professional category. However, the majority of
category A and B health workers were against this egal-
ity principle. In their opinion, only the socio-
professional category should have been considered, not
individual performance. This difference of views among
health workers sometimes led to tensions. Some health
workers of socio-professional categories C, D, and E re-
ported that they work more than those of higher cat-
egories A and B, and therefore should have received the
same or higher amounts. For example, in DH 2, a health
worker refused to receive his subsidies because he con-
sidered the amount inadequate in relation to the effort
made. Nevertheless, the vast majority of health workers
did not openly express their dissatisfaction:
“the way we did it (the distribution of subsidies),
even if they don't tell us we know there's frustra-
tion” [General physician, DH2]
Discussion
Our study is the first in Mali to explore the expectations
of health workers with regard to the first cycle of PBF
subsidies payment, and its effects on their motivation. It
is one of the few publications in French-speaking West
Africa on the subject, and the first to explore dynamics
of the initial days of PBF.
PBF motivates but can also demotivate health workers
Our findings show that PBF can motivate health workers
to increase effort at work. However, our findings show
that if it is poorly adapted to the implementation context
or poorly implemented, it can become a source of demo-
tivation and thus produce the opposite effect to that ini-
tially intended. Our results show that the principle of
the PBF mechanism is well received by health workers.
For them, the fact that they benefitted from subsidies
under PBF motivated them to improve their perform-
ance. However, difficulties in implementation had a
negative impact on their motivation. The delay of PBF
subsidies led to a lack of confidence among health
workers both in the PBF mechanism and in their man-
agers. Stakeholder confidence in the health system is an
important factor and is indicative of interpersonal rela-
tionships within the organization [36, 37]. In South
Africa, Gilson et al. showed that health providers’ trust
in their manager and the employing organization are im-
portant factors influencing performance [38]. Within the
framework of the implementation of the PBF in Mali,
preserving trust of the providers towards the PBF and
those in charge would have required more effective
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communication and transparency in the organizational
and financial management of the hospitals.
Two of the DHs had not applied staff performance
evaluation as a criterion for calculating individual
subsidies. In Mali, the modalities for sharing PBF sub-
sidies varied by setting and among DHs. Several stud-
ies (in Benin [12], Tanzania [18], and Burkina Faso
[17, 39]) show that the methods of distribution of
PBF subsidies in health centers are heterogeneous.
Interestingly, in these studies suggesting that whatever
the modalities chosen, there was sometimes tension
among providers within the health centers. In
Tanzania, for example, the methods for distributing
PBF incentives varied among health units in health
centers (60% to be shared among reproductive health
staff, 30% among other staff, and 10% at the health
centers) [18], which led to tension. In Mali, since the
PBF intervention is performance-based, the failure to
choose this performance criterion for the calculation
of subsidies was perceived as unfair by health
workers. Burkina Faso [17, 39], Benin [12], and
Tanzania [18] all experienced similar feelings of in-
equity with regard to the distribution process and the
criteria chosen for calculating individual PBF subsid-
ies. In Tanzania, perceived unfairness by health
workers negatively affected work motivation and
undermined teamwork between services [18]. In Bur-
kina Faso, in some health centres, managers disre-
garded the planned performance criteria, which was
unfair to health workers [17, 39].
In Mali, the lack of feedback for health workers on
their performance evaluation under PBF meant that the
program missed out on the opportunity to improve in-
ternal motivation, i.e., recognition of the tasks they per-
form in their work. In Burkina Faso, health workers
appreciated the feedback during the implementation of
the PBF because it enabled them to improve recognition
of their work, and they made an effort to change follow-
ing negative feedback [17]. However, in Tanzania, health
workers reported insufficient feedback on their perform-
ance evaluation [40]. This lack of feedback resonates
with the psychological literature on motivation, which
stresses that the implementation of an effective perform-
ance evaluation system is essential to promoting internal
motivation at work [41]. In particular, the literature
shows that perceived fairness in the performance ap-
praisal process can affect workers’ relationship with
managers, their performance, their job satisfaction, and
their well-being [42–44].
The delay of PBF subsidies within hospitals led to ru-
mors circulating among some health workers, accusing
officials of embezzling the subsidies. This circulation of
rumors about PBF subsidies shows the importance that
health workers attach to subsidies issues, specifically to
their timely payment to avoid unfavorable incidents [45]
or if persisting, obstacles to the successful delivery of
health interventions [46].
Recourse to a logic of financial profitability is increas-
ingly used to finance public health policies [47]. By using
performance criteria, the PBF mechanism illustrates a
contractual approach based on a logic of financial profit-
ability. PBF is a form of financialization of public health
policies;in other words, “the penetration of financialized
logics and forms of evaluation in the formulation and
implementation of policies, even when these do not con-
cern the financial sector” [48]. In addition, the financiali-
sation of public policies leads to the creation of new
financial circuits [48]. The implementation of the PBF
has brought additional money into hospitals, on top of
the money usually invested. The implementation of PBF
brings a new flow of money into the health care system.
This new financial circuit completely changes the finan-
cing architecture that existed, where funds were injected
by donors into the health system via the central level
through different levels before landing in the health cen-
tres at the local level. This new financial circuit brought
about by the PBF changed and structured the relation-
ship between the beneficiaries (hospitals and health
workers) and the health financing circuit. This new fi-
nancial circuit allows for a market relationship (signing
contracts, exchanging money, and setting the conditions
for distributing the money) between a buyer (PBF’s spe-
cialized agency in our case) and suppliers (hospitals and
health workers). The process of distributing PBF subsid-
ies to hospitals in Mali shows us how PBF as a new
health financing mechanism has changed the financing
circuit of hospitals.
Discrepancy between health workers’ expectations of PBF
subsidies and the reality of implementation
A systematic review showed that the implementation of
health initiatives requiring change in the health systems
of LMICs is often complex and difficult [49]. There is
often a gap between what was planned and what was
achieved [50]. Moreover, public health policies are
sometimes more incoherent and ineffective in the con-
text of Sub-Saharan African [51]. Our study showed that
the expectations of healthcare professionals regarding
the individual subsidies was not met. When health
workers saw how things worked in reality, it led to frus-
tration and disappointment. It is important to differenti-
ate relative frustration, as in our study (ie frustration in
relation to expectations) from absolute frustration. Cor-
cuff defines relative frustration as: “a state of tension be-
tween expected and denied satisfaction, resulting in
dissatisfaction, feeding a potential for dissatisfaction and
collective action” [27]. The frustration of the health
workers in our study, therefore, stems from their
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comparison of what they have achieved in terms of earn-
ings and socially constructed expectations. We believe
that in Mali, health workers’ expectations of the PBF
were too high during the pilot project; the majority of
the workers expected at least the same amount that they
obtained during the pre-pilot PBF project. They did not
account for the fact that the PBF pilot project had fewer
paid indicators compared to the pre-pilot project, and
that the indicator purchasing scales were higher during
the pre-pilot project compared to the pilot project. It is
unclear whether their expectations were unreasonable,
or grounded in lack of information about differences be-
tween the two schemes. Interestingly, in Tanzania,
health workers were reporting positive – but in retro-
spect slightly unrealistic – expectations of the interven-
tion even without “precedent” as in Mali. They felt that
the possibility of future financial incentives should
strengthen their motivation [42].
With respect to motivational and behavioural effects,
we observed enthusiasm at the beginning of the imple-
mentation of the PBF intervention. We believe that the
motivational and behavioural effects of the early days
may have an impact on the long-term motivation of the
actors. Motivation is a dynamic process; it is important
to understand the changes in this dynamic process and
their causes. Actors adjust their motivational expecta-
tions and reactions, both positive and negative, over
time. Even if some problems persist when implementing
complex initiatives such as PBF, positive and/or negative
motivational reactions normalize or diminish over time.
Unfortunately, in Mali, this normalization was not pos-
sible given the short duration of the project. Seppey and
al. further demonstrated the lack of sustainability of the
PBF in Mali [13]. The same observation was made by
Antony and al. who, in their study in Benin, noted the
lack of sustainability and institutional anchoring of the
PBF pilot projects [12]. Several studies show that the
vast majority of development projects initiated by NGOs
and donors in African countries are unsustainable or
low [13, 51]. However, short-term interventions are in-
creasingly prioritized by donors at the expense of
medium- and long-term interventions in LMICs [10]. In
Mali, PBF certainly was one of those interventions that
ended quickly without being able to rectify some of the
negative effects due to its initial implementation chal-
lenges. When implementing development projects in the
context of LMICs, it is necessary to analyze the frustra-
tions that arise in the first days of interventions in order
to readjust the projects. It is essential to ensure the sus-
tainability of these projects from the design stage to fa-
cilitate the overall strengthening of health systems.
Based on our experience, we propose that policies
should have three priorities: (i) they should prioritize
long-term projects where implementing actors will have
more time to identify and correct implementation errors,
and better adapt them to local contexts; (ii) they should
aim to reduce the negative effects (delay in the payment
of subsidies, lack of transparency in the subsidies sharing
process, and the feeling of inadequacy between the work
provided and the amount of subsidies obtained) that can
demotivate health workers; and (iii), in baseline studies
of a project aimed at motivating health workers, they
should clearly identify workers’ expectations with regard
to subsidies so as to better adapt the project and the
communication of the project.
Limitation of the study
Our research has certain limitations. First, the experience
in hospitals during the implementation of the PBF and the
opinions of the sampled health workers are not necessarily
representative of all ten health districts in Koulikoro Re-
gion. Second, the data collection was carried out in a
cross-sectional and retrospective manner. Some of the
frustrations observed during data collection may have
overshadowed the initial positive experiences with the
intervention. Third, the subsidies were distributed several
months after the PBF pilot project was terminated. As a
result, some of the deviations observed during the subsid-
ies sharing process may have been different if the imple-
mentation continued. Fourth, PBF was a donor-funded
development project, even if the study was conducted in-
dependently. Thus, the interviews may have included a so-
cial desirability bias or prompted respondents to have a
normative discourse. Response bias could include strategic
responses from respondents who thought that their an-
swers might influence the possible return of PBF. To re-
duce response bias, we have insisted on our independence
from the PBF implementing agency in Mali.
Conclusion
Our study showed that the PBF pilot project had both
positive and negative effects on health worker motiv-
ation. Because there was not enough time for the actors
to adjust their initial motivational expectations and reac-
tions, PBF ended in frustration for many health workers
built up during the first days of the intervention. There-
fore, the motivational and behavioural effects of the first
few days can have an impact on the long-term motiv-
ation of the actors.
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